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COMMENTS
The Permissibility of Shackling or Gagging
Pro Se Criminal Defendants
Brooksany Barrowest
Stories of belligerent criminal defendants abound in televi-
sion dramas and trial accounts featured in the mainstream press.
Cases record countless examples of defendants becoming violent
toward courtroom personnel,' using obscene or inappropriate lan-
guage,2 or threatening judges and witnesses.3  Methods for deal-
ing with such obstructionist behavior range from verbal warnings
to citations for contempt to the use of physical restraints, includ-
ing handcuffs, leg irons, and gags.4 In extreme cases, judges may
even expel misbehaving defendants from the courtroom.' Judges
have discretion to use these sanctions to maintain the dignity,
t BA . 1996, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Chicago.
See, for example, United States v Stewart, 20 F3d 911, 912-15 (8th Cir 1994) (court
restrained defendant because he had assaulted a Department of Corrections Officer);
Scurr v Moore, 647 F2d 854, 855 (8th Cir 1981) (court ordered that defendant wear hand-
cuffs and a body belt inside a coat after he had assaulted a jailer during a recess, inflicting
"brutal facial injuries"); United States v Ives, 504 F2d 935, 942-45 (9th Cir 1974), vacated,
421 US 944 (1975), reinstated in part on remand, 547 F2d 1100 (9th Cir 1976) (defendant
refused to answer questions, argued with the judge, struck defense counsel on several
occasions, and physically attacked the United States Attorneys).
2 See, for example, State v Plunkett, 934 P2d 113, 116 (Kan 1997) (upholding termi-
nation of defendants self-representation after he maintained a surly, disrespectful atti-
tude throughout the proceeding, became belligerent and used profanity during argument
on motions, refused to stand when addressing the court, and stopped answering the
judge's questions); People v Davis, 851 P2d 239, 243-44 (Colo App 1993) (upholding exclu-
sion of defendant from courtroom after he spat in the prosecutor's face, fought with deputy
sheriffs, and physically attacked and shouted obscenities at a prosecution witness).
2 See, for example, Stewart v Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 494-96 (9th Cir 1988) (defendant
threatened the trial judge, used abusive language, and intimidated a witness with his
conduct).
' Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 343-44 (1970) (holding that constitutionally permissi-
ble remedies include binding and gagging the defendant, citing him for contempt, or re-
moving him from the courtroom). See also Tanksley v State, 946 P2d 148, 150-51 (Nev
1997) (finding defendant in contempt for talking back and behaving disrespectfully);
Scurr, 647 F2d at 855 (upholding court order that defendant wear handcuffs and a body
belt inside a coat after he assaulted a jailer); Stewart, 20 F3d at 915 (affirming lower
court's decision to place defendant in leg irons during trial); Stewart, 850 F2d at 499-500
(affirming decision to gag defendant for repeatedly disobeying court orders and intimi-
dating a witness).
' Allen, 397 US at 343-44. See also Burks v State, 792 SW2d 835, 837 (Tex Crim
App 1990); Ives, 504 F2d at 938.
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order, and decorum of the courtroom and the judicial process.6
The question of appropriate restraint becomes much more
complex, however, when the belligerent party is not only the de-
fendant, but also his own attorney. Can an individual adequately
represent himself with his hands cuffed behind his back or one
hand cuffed to his chair? Such restraints impede his ability to
take notes or move freely. What if it becomes necessary to gag a
defendant who represents himself? He can no longer make objec-
tions, question witnesses, or address the jury. Whether or not the
defendant represents himself, court-imposed restraints can have
significant effects on the jury.' Jurors may speculate about what
the defendant has done to deserve such punishment. They may
interpret the need for restraints as an indication that the court
already attaches some level of guilt to the defendant.8
A court's decision to restrain a pro se defendant involves
complex constitutional inquiries. This Comment clarifies the
relevant issues and makes recommendations for balancing the
competing interests which arise when a pro se defendant disrupts
his own trial.
Part I examines the right of self-representation, first estab-
lished in the landmark case Faretta v California,9 as part of the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of legal counsel in a criminal trial.
Part II addresses the appropriate use of restraints at trial, ex-
plaining how Illinois v Allen' ° and its progeny affect criminal
cases where an obstreperous defendant represents himself. Part
Il examines cases that have considered the effects of physically
restraining a pro se defendant. In each of these cases, the courts
emphasized different issues and reached different results. Part
IV synthesizes the concerns raised by these courts, and proposes
a plan for addressing them.
This Comment proposes three reforms: (1) a formal hearing,
outside the presence of the jury, before imposing physical re-
straints on a pro se defendant; (2) a chance for the defendant to
challenge the need for restraints; and (3) mandatory appointment
8 Allen, 397 US at 343-44.
In Allen, the Supreme Court observed that "the sight of shackles and gags might
have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant .... " 397 US at 344.
8 The Supreme Court has said that shackling unmistakably indicates "the need to
separate a defendant from the community at large." Holbrook v Flynn, 475 US 560, 568-
69 (1986). In Lemons v Skidmore, the Seventh Circuit said that "courts [have) found that
the appearance of the defendant in shackles would prejudice the jury, causing them to
believe that the person was dangerous." 985 F2d 354, 357 (7th Cir 1993).
9 422 US 806 (1975).
10 397 US 337 (1970).
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of standby counsel for all defendants who proceed pro se." By
using these reforms, judges can preserve the dignity of the court-
room and protect the courts from disruption and abuse without
infringing on the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. This pro-
posal keeps authority squarely with the defendant to conduct his
trial as he wishes, unless he forfeits that opportunity by violating
established rules.
I. THE RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
The Sixth Amendment defines a defendant's opportunity to
present a full defense:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury and
... , to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his fa-
vor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence. 2
Taken together, these rights comprise the right to make a defense
in the adversarial system of criminal justice, 3 and form part of
the right to due process that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees to defendants in state criminal courts. 4 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution to guarantee a person brought to trial in any federal
or state court the right to assistance of counsel before a court can
correctly imprison him.'5
" The term "standby counsel" refers to both advisory counsel for a defendant who
represents himself and defense counsel for the defendant whose pro se status has been
terminated. Sheila Oliver, Recent Decision, Criminal Procedure - Right to Standby
Counsel of Choice - United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988), 62 Temple L
Rev 451,451 n 4 (1989).
12 US Const, Amend VI.
" Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 818 (1975).
" See Gideon u Wainwright, 372 US 335, 339-42 (1963); Argersinger v Hamlin, 407
US 25, 28-32 (1972).
" This principle emerged from a series of cases decided earlier this century. See
Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 71 (1932) (failure of trial court to make an effective ap-
pointment of counsel in capital offense prosecution denied due process of law where defen-
dants were young, ignorant, illiterate, and surrounded by hostile sentiment); Johnson v
Zerbst, 304 US 458, 467-68 (1938) (ruling that Sixth Amendment withholds from federal
courts the power to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the
assistance of counsel); Gideon, 372 US at 341-45 (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee the absolute right to assistance of counsel for criminal defendants
in both state and federal courts); Argersinger, 407 US at 37 ("[ajbsent a knowing and in-
telligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether... petty, misde-
3491
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In Faretta v California,6 the Supreme Court elaborated on
this right, stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide
merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to
the accused personally the right to make his defense."" The
Court also stated that "the right to self-representation - to make
one's own defense personally - is thus necessarily implied by the
structure of the Amendment.""8
Anthony Faretta faced charges of grand theft in the Los An-
geles County Superior Court and requested that the court allow
him to represent himself.9 The judge informed Faretta that he
believed the choice to waive counsel and proceed pro se would be
a mistake." Then the judge made a preliminary ruling accepting
Faretta's waiver of counsel, but indicated that he might reverse
this decision "if it later appeared that Faretta was unable ade-
quately to represent himself."2' Prior to trial, the judge sua
sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct
his own defense.22
In the sua sponte hearing, the judge questioned Faretta
about the hearsay rule and California law governing challenge of
jurors,' then ruled that Faretta had not made a knowing and
intelligent waiver.24 The judge also ruled that Faretta had no
constitutional right to conduct his own defense and appointed the
public defender to represent himY Faretta was convicted and
sentenced to prison. The California Court of Appeal afrmed
the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state consti-
tutional right to represent himself.'7 The court denied Faretta's
petition for rehearing without opinion, and the California Su-
preme Court denied review.8 The United States Supreme Court
meanor, or felony, unless... represented by counsel.").
16 422 US 806 (1975).
11 Id at 819.
18 Id.
, Id at 807.
422 US at 807-08.
21 Id. The judge also told Faretta that he would not receive special favors as a pro se
defendant. Id at 808 n 2.
Id at 808.
Id at 808-10 & n 3.
422 US at 808-810.
Id at 810. Faretta had previously told the judge that he did not wish to be repre-
sented by the public defender because he believed that office was overwhelmed with a
heavy case load. Id at 807.
Id at 811.
Id at 811-12.
' The California court based its conclusion on California's procedural rule that an
indigent criminal defendant had no right to appointed counsel of his choice. 422 US at
812 n 8.
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granted certiorari to consider "whether a state criminal defen-
dant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when
he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so."29 The Court an-
swered in the affirmative, reversing Faretta's conviction and re-
manding the case.30
A watershed case, Faretta defined self-representation as a
constitutionally-guaranteed right, binding on all the states.
Nonetheless, this was not the first time that the Supreme Court
had addressed the issue of pro se criminal defendants. Writing
for the majority in Faretta, Justice Stewart cited federal statu-
tory authority for self-representation,3 1 support from state consti-
tutions and state court interpretations of the United States Con-
stitution,32 and past Supreme Court decisions that supported a
criminal defendant's opportunity to represent himself.' Stewart
then turned to the Sixth Amendment and concluded that forcing
counsel on an accused violates the logic of the requirement of as-
sistance of counsel.'
At its most basic level, the Faretta decision guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to control his own defense." The
defendant, not his counsel, has the right to confront witnesses
against him, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion, and be accorded compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor.36 It follows that the defendant also has the right-to
accept or reject the assistance of counsel. The Faretta Court
admitted that, in most instances, rejection of counsel will have a
detrimental effect on a defendant's case, but nevertheless ruled
2 Id at 807.
Id at 835-36.
" Justice Stewart quoted Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, "in all the courts of
the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by
the assistance of such counsel ... " as evidence of long-standing statutory protection of
the right of self-representation. 422 US at 812-13. This right is currently codified at 28
USC § 1654 (1994).
422 US at 813-14 nn 9-11.
" Justice Stewart discussed Adams v McCann, 317 US 269, 275 (1942) (holding that
an accused may competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance
of counsel); and Carter v Illinois, 329 US 173, 174-75 (1946) (recognizing that the Consti-
tution does not require that counsel be forced upon a defendant). 422 US at 814-15.
422 US at 819-21.
Comment, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro Se Defendants: Maintaining Fair-
ness in the Criminal Trial, 72 Cal L Rev 697, 701 (1984) ("Essential to the Faretta Court's
reasoning was its concern with protecting what it saw as a basic aspect of American jus-
tice - the individual autonomy of the defendant.").
422 US at 819.
Id at 819-20 ("The right to defend is given directly to the accused ... [counsel]
shall be an aid to a willing defendant - not an organ of the State interposed between an
unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.").
349] 353
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that a defendant still must have this option."5 In short, Faretta
holds that "[t]he right to defend is given directly to the accused;
for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."39
The Court did, however, impose several limitations on the
right to self-representation. First, a defendant must knowingly
and intelligently relinquish the benefits associated with the right
to counsel.40 The purpose of this waiver is not to allow pro se rep-
resentation based on the defendant's lack of skill as a lawyer, but
merely to ensure that the defendant is aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation 4 '
In a lengthy footnote, the Faretta Court further limited the
Id at 834. The Court also noted that in some rare cases the defendant will actually
present his case more effectively than counsel could have done, but concluded that
"[p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal."
Id.
Id at 819-20.
422 US at 835. The circuits currently disagree on exactly what safeguards meet
this standard. The majority view, held by seven circuits, maintains that although a collo-
quy on the record is always preferable, the trial judge may determine the "sufficiency of
the waiver from the record as a whole rather than from a formalistic, deliberate, and
searching inquiry." United States v Gallop, 838 F2d 105, 110 (4th Cir 1988). See also
United States v Hafen, 726 F2d 21, 24-26 (1st Cir 1984); Wiggins v Procunier, 753 F2d
1318, 1320-21 (5th Cir 1985); United States v Bell, 901 F2d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir 1990);
Gilbert v Lockhart, 930 F2d 1356, 1358-59 (8th Cir 1991); United States v Kimmel, 672
F2d 720, 721-22 (9th Cir 1982); Strozier v Newsome, 926 F2d 1100, 1104-05 (11th Cir
1991). By giving the trial judge broad discretion to determine waiver, these circuits allow
for a more fact-specific, case-by-case analysis of a defendant's decision to proceed without
counsel. A court may, however, fail to inquire deeply enough into the defendant's decision
to represent himself.
The Third, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits require the trial judge to record a "searching
inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the defendant's waiver was understanding and vol-
untary." United States v Welty, 674 F2d 185, 189 (3d Cir 1982). See also United States v
Padilla, 819 F2d 952, 956-57 (10th Cir 1987); United States v Bailey, 675 F2d 1292, 1300-
02 (DC Cir 1982). Similarly, the Second Circuit advocates a "recorded colloquy" between
the court and the defendant in which "the accused is informed of his right to an attorney,
his right to self-representation, and the decided advantages of competent legal representa-
tion." United States v Tompkins, 623 F2d 824, 828 (2d Cir 1980). These standards create
a record of the trial judge's inquiry into the defendant's waiver of counsel, which can sim-
plify appeals of waiver.
Most restrictively, the Sixth Circuit exercised its supervisory powers in United
States v McDowell to require courts to follow the model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book
for United States District Judges. 814 F2d 245, 249-50 (6th Cir 1987). The Bench Book
lists fourteen questions for a trial judge to ask a defendant and provides advice to the
judge on how to evaluate the defendant's answers. Bench Book § 1.02 at 3-5 (4th ed
1996). The uniformity of these instructions within the Sixth Circuit guarantees that each
potential pro se defendant will receive an ample inquiry into his decision before the judge
grants permission to proceed. Judges may, however, merely recite the questions without a
genuine, in-depth discussion of the waiver of counsel.
This Comment does not explore this controversy further because none of the pro se
cases relevant to physical restraints have raised questions of adequacy of waiver. Further
Supreme Court attention to this area, however, may affect how courts treat pro se defen-
dants.
422 US at 835.
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right of self-representation. The Court indicated that the trial
judge could "still terminate self-representation by a defendant
who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist miscon-
duct" or deliberately disrupts his trial.42 This condition allows
judges to protect the courtroom from abuse while preserving de-
fendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
In the same footnote, Faretta preserved a judge's ability to
appoint standby counsel, even over a defendant's objections.
The Court predicted that standby counsel could serve two pur-
poses. The standby counsel is available if the accused requests
help; and can also take over the defense if the court terminates
the defendant's self-representation. Finally, Faretta held that a
defendant who elects to represent himself cannot bring an appeal
on the basis that the quality of his own defense amounted to a
denial of effective assistance of counsel.45 This holding makes the
knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel critical because, in or-
der to successfully claim ineffective assistance, the defendant
must assert that he failed to understand the disadvantages of
self-representation at the waiver stage, not after a failed defense.
In summary, Faretta yields three important principles. First,
Faretta establishes Sixth Amendment rights as essential ele-
ments of a defense, connecting them to the guarantee of due proc-
ess of law.4" Second, the case rests on the principle of defendant
autonomy and control over his defense.47 Third, Faretta demon-
strates that the right of self-representation is not absolute.48
E. JUDGES HAVE DISCRETION TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANTS
In Illinois v Allen, 9 a case that preceded Faretta by five
years, the Supreme Court established that a criminal defendant
who misbehaves can forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to be pre-
sent at trial." Allen gives judges discretion to remove a defen-
dant in order to maintain the dignity and decorum of the court-
room.
51
,2 Id at 834-35 n 46, citingIllinois v Allen, 397 US 337 (1970).
422 US at 834-35 n 46, citing United States v Dougherty, 473 F2d 1113, 1124-26
(DC Cir 1972).
422 US at 834-35 n 46, citingDougherty, 473 F2d at 1124-26.
' 422 US at 834-35 n 46.
,3 Id at 818.
'3 Id at 819.
Id at 834-35 n 46.
397 US 337 (1970).
Id at 343.
" Id.
355349]
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An Illinois trial court removed William Allen from his origi-
nal trial, where he acted as his own attorney, after he exhibited
an intent to delay the proceedings and argued with and threat-
ened the judge.52 The judge warned Allen, saying, "One more
outbreak of that sort and I'll remove you from the courtroom, 13
but Allen continued in the same belligerent manner.' The judge
removed Allen for the remainder of voir dire.55 After a recess, the
judge informed Allen that he could return to the courtroom if he
behaved himself and did not interfere with the case. 6 The jury
returned, and Allen resumed his disruptive behavior, so the judge
ordered that Allen be removed a second time.57
The jury convicted Allen of armed robbery, and the Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction." Allen then filed a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the judge had
wrongfully deprived him of his constitutional right to remain pre-
sent throughout his trial.59 The District Court declined to issue
the writ of habeas corpus." The Court of Appeals reversed,6' and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a de-
fendant forfeits his constitutional right to be present at the trial
when he "engages in speech and conduct which is so noisy, disor-
derly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly im-
possible to carry on the trial."62
In answering that question, the Supreme Court listed three
constitutionally permissible ways for judges to handle an ob-
52 Id at 339-41, citing facts from Allen v Illinois, 413 F2d 232, 233-34 (7th Cir 1969).
Allen became disruptive during voir dire, questioning the first juror at great length, then
arguing with the judge "in a most abusive and disrespectful manner." Allen, 413 F2d at
233. After some time the judge asked standby counsel to examine the jurors. Allen re-
sponded by telling the judge "when I go out for lunchtime, you're ... going to be a corpse
here." Id. Allen then tore his attorney's file and threw the papers on the floor. Id.
413 F2d at 233-34.
After the judge's warning, Allen continued to talk back to the judge, telling him
repeatedly: 'There's not going to be no trial." Id at 234.
5 Id.
Id.
" 413 F2d at 233-34. Allen had again interrupted the proceedings to tell the court
that there was not going to be a trial, and he verbally protested removal of the witnesses.
Id.
People v Allen, 226 NE2d 1 (Ill 1967).
Allen, 397 US at 339. This right arises from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " See also Lewis v United States,
146 US 370, 372 (1892) ("A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal
procedure is that, after indictment is found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the
prisoner.").
Illinois v Allen, 397 US at 339.
Allen v Illinois, 413 F2d at 235.
397 US at 338.
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streperous defendant such as Allen: (1) bind and gag him; (2) cite
him for contempt; or (3) remove him from the courtroom until he
promises to conduct himself properly." The Court left the choice
among these options to the judge's discretion, but pointed out
that "no person should be tried while shackled and gagged except
as a last resort.' This conclusion reflected the Court's concern
about the harmful effects such restraints could have on the jury's
feelings about the defendant, the hindrance to the defendant's
ability to communicate with counsel, and the inherent tension
between the presence of a shackled and gagged defendant and the
dignity of judicial proceedings.'
Judges have invoked the options provided in Allen to control
disruptive defendants, both represented and pro se, who exhibit
widely varying forms of misconduct.66 The most important ques-
tions to emerge from Allen are the extent of restraint appropriate
in a particular case and the proper procedure for making that
determination.'
Some jurisdictions impose restraints only after holding a
hearing in which the defendant can contest the necessity of
shackling.' Moreover, building on the statement in Allen that a
defendant should be shackled as a last resort, a number of courts
have encouraged the use of less restrictive measures whenever
practicable.69
Id at 343-44.
Id at 344.
Id.
See, for example, Bostic v State, 531 S2d 1210, 1212-14 (Miss 1988) (upholding
trial court's decision to remove represented defendant from the courtroom following dis-
ruptive behavior); People v Davis, 851 P2d 239, 243-44 (Colo App 1993) (upholding exclu-
sion of pro se defendant from courtroom after he spat in the prosecutor's face, fought with
deputy sheriffs, and shouted obscenities at and physically attacked a prosecution witness).
See, for example, United States v Zuber, 118 F3d 101, 103-04 (2d Cir 1997) (up-
holding the trial court's reliance on United States Marshals Service to help evaluate the
need to employ physical restraints); Spain v Rushen, 883 F2d 712, 721 (9th Cir 1989) (the
court must "pursue less restrictive alternatives before imposing physical restraints");
Jones v Meyer, 899 F2d 883, 884-85 (9th Cir 1990) (upholding use of shackles only when
justified by the need to maintain security and after consideration of less restrictive alter-
natives).
6 See Loux v United States, 389 F2d 911, 919 (9th Cir 1968) (holding that decision to
shackle defendant should be made after affording defendant a right to challenge it); Wil-
son v McCarthy, 770 F2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir 1985) (decision to shackle witness for the
defense made after a hearing); Elledge v Dugger, 823 F2d 1439, 1450-52 (11th Cir 1987)
(defendant was denied due process when he was shackled at sentencing hearing without
having an opportunity to contest the necessity of shackling); Kennedy v Cardwell, 487 F2d
101, 110 (6th Cir 1973) (court should hold formal hearing to determine whether defendant
should be shackled).
" See, for example, Woodward v Perrin, 692 F2d 220, 221 (1st Cir 1982) ("[A] judge
should consider less restrictive measures before deciding that a defendant should be
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Courts take the decision to physically restrain a defendant at
trial very seriously." They worry about the effect restraints may
have on the jury.7' This issue becomes especially problematic
when the defendant represents himself.72 In addition, the inher-
ent limitations imposed by restraints impede the physical aspects
of presenting a case. 3 It follows that courts should use great cau-
tion when employing physical restraints on a pro se defendant in
order to avoid prejudicing the jury or unjustifiably hindering the
defendant's opportunity to adequately represent himself.
III. PHYsIcAL RESTRAINTS AND PRo SE DEFENDANTS
Only a small number of defendants who were shackled or
gagged when representing themselves have claimed on appeal
that such action denied them their constitutional rights. The few
courts to analyze the issue have responded in different ways.
Analysis of three relevant decisions shows the need to clarify the
law regarding appropriate judicial responses to obstreperous pro
se defendants.
A. Stewart v Corbin
In Stewart v Corbin,74 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court's decision to gag and shackle Alexander Stewart did not
violate his right of self-representation.75 While the appeals court
recognized that the gag interfered with Stewart's right of self-
shackled."); Hamilton v Vasquez, 882 F2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir 1989) (explaining the "duty
of the trial court to examine less restrictive measures" before shackling a defendant);
Kennedy v Cardwell, 487 F2d 101, 111 (6th Cir 1973) ("[lIt is an abuse of discretion pre-
cipitously to employ shackles when less drastic security measures will adequately and
reasonably suffice.").
70 The Ninth Circuit, for example, laid out five problems to consider when weighing
shackling against other alternatives: (1) shackles may reverse the presumption of inno-
cence by causing jury prejudice; (2) shackles may impair the defendant's mental faculties;
(3) shackles may impede communication between the defendant and his counsel; (4)
shackles may detract from 'the decorum of the judicial proceeding, and (5) shackles may
cause pain to the defendant. Spain, 883 F2d at 721.
7 Exhibiting a physically restrained defendant before the jury is not a per se viola-
tion of due process, but certainly raises due process concerns. Tyars v Finner, 709 F2d
1274, 1284 (9th Cir 1983).
See Part IVA 2.
For example, a defendant in a leg brace has difficulty getting in and out of his seat
for examination of witnesses; a defendant in handcuffs cannot gesture freely or take notes;
a defendant shackled to the table or his chair cannot move about the courtroom to ap-
proach the witnesses or jury; and a gagged defendant cannot verbalize his arguments,
objections, or questions.
7' 850 F2d 492, 493 (9th Cir 1988).
7' Id at 500.
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representation, it nevertheless held that the interference was
necessary.6
Stewart was before an Arizona trial court on an armed rob-
bery charge.77 In a pretrial hearing on the prosecution's motion to
shackle Stewart during the trial, the court learned that Stewart
had escaped from custody twice before, had physically assaulted a
deputy at an earlier pretrial hearing, and had engaged in a pat-
tern of disruptive conduct in the courtroom, including yelling at
and threatening judges.7" On this basis, the trial court concluded
that Stewart should be shackled and handcuffed during the
trial.79
The decision to gag Stewart followed his deliberate violation
of court orders not to refer to a lie detector test and not to men-
tion in front of the jury that the victim had a prior conviction for
car theft."e The judge had warned Stewart that, if he violated
these orders, the judge would have him gagged.8 Before ordering
that Stewart be gagged, the trial judge offered instead to place
him in a soundproof cell, but Stewart refused." The judge then
appointed defense counsel who "was evidently fully prepared and
had been standing by in case appellant's pro [se] rights were ter-
minated for just the type of misconduct that had occurred.'
The jury convicted Stewart, but the Arizona State Court of
Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the
ground that the circumstances did not justify the extreme meas-
ure of shackling Stewart.' The Arizona Supreme Court dis-
agreed and reinstated Stewart's conviction and sentence, holding
that the record supported use of shackles and a gag." Having
exhausted his state remedies, Stewart then filed a petition for a
" Id. The court conducted a two-part inquiry, finding first that gagging was re-
quired under the circumstances and second that it was a permissible remedy. Id. The
court then added that the appointment of standby counsel insulated Stewart's defense
from harm. Id.
Id at 493.
78 850 F2d at 494-95.
Id at 495.
'o Id at 495-96. Stewart began his opening statement to the jury by calling the vic-
tim a convicted car thief. Id at 495. The trial court promptly warned Stewart that his
behavior was unacceptable, and Stewart responded by blurting out twice that the court
had denied him the opportunity to take a lie detector test. Id. Stewart also intimidated a
witness, who told the court he was afraid of Stewart and terrified by the courtroom scene.
Id at 495-96.
Id at 495.
850 F2d at 496. Stewart refused the offer of a soundproof room because he did not
want to be placed where he could not communicate with his attorney or with the jury. Id.
83 Id.
State v Stewart, 676 P2d 1124, 1130 (Ariz App 1983).
Id at 1114-15, 1118.
349] 359
360 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1998:
writ of habeas corpus.8 6 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
trial court had not denied Stewart a fair trial under the circum-
stances, based largely on the trial court's determination that
Stewart's outrageous behavior and disregard for court orders had
made the restraints necessary. 7 The court also emphasized that
the appointment of standby counsel sufficiently protected Stewart
from further harm,'c combining these factors, the court rejected
Stewart's argument that the gagging violated his right of self-
representation.89
B. United States v Stewart
In a later case involving the same defendant, the Eighth Cir-
cuit also refused to find that physical restraints at trial had vio-
lated Stewart's right to an impartial jury.'° In this case, Stewart
was charged with assault and retaliation against a witness for
punching an Arkansas Department of Corrections officer.9' Be-
fore trial, Stewart filed a motion to dismiss his appointed counsel
and represent himself.92 The District Court granted the motion,
but appointed standby counsel. 3 Stewart represented himself at
trial while wearing leg irons and prison clothing, and was con-
victed on the assault charge. 4
On appeal, Stewart alleged that jury prejudice from seeing
him in prison clothing and leg irons violated the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury.98 The Supreme Court had
held that a criminal jury must determine guilt or innocence based
on the evidence presented at trial, not on irrelevant factors. 6
Stewart argued that the prison clothing and leg irons should fit
into the category of prejudicial, irrelevant factors that could taint
a jury.9" The Eighth Circuit pointed out, however, that the possi-
Stewart v Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 496 (9th Cir 1988).
Id at 499-500. The Ninth Circuit noted that "the issue in the present case [was]
not whether in retrospect, the trial court could have handled the matter better, but rather,
whether the trial court denied appellant a fair trial under the circumstances." Id at 497.
Id at 500.
Id.
United States v Stewart, 20 F3d 911, 915-16 (8th Cir 1994).
Id at 912-13 Although involving the same defendant discussed in Part III A, the
charges in each of Stewares cases are separate.
Id at 913.
' Id.
20 F3d at 914.
Id at 915. See US Const, Amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury...
Holbrook v Flynn, 475 US 560, 567 (1986).
' 20 F3d at 915.
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bility of prejudice must be balanced against the need to both
maintain order in the courtroom and retain custody of incarcer-
ated persons.
The Eighth Circuit found that, despite the potential for jury
prejudice, the District Court had justifiably required Stewart to
wear leg irons for several reasons.99 First, Stewart was accused of
an assault in a courtroom, and even admitted his guilt on this
count in front of the jury."° Second, Stewart was disruptive and
disrespectful at his arraignment hearing.'' Third, Stewart dis-
played a hostile attitude the court could reasonably believe would
lead to disruptive behavior at trial.0 2 Having determined that
the leg irons were not injurious, the court also found that forcing
the defendant to wear prison clothing did not constitute error.0 3
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Stewart's previous case, the
Eighth Circuit did not consider whether Stewart's physical re-
straints denied him his right to represent himself. The Ninth
Circuit had discussed this issue, but decided the facts did not rise
to such a violation."°4 The Eighth Circuit considered only the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury.0 5
C. Oses v Massachusetts
A third case, Oses v Massachusetts,"° reached a different re-
sult than either Stewart case. In his state court trial, Thomas
Oses waived his right to counsel and conducted his own defense
with court-appointed standby counsel present.0" The jury con-
victed Oses and, fourteen years later, he brought a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court, alleging a violation of his
Id, citing Holbrook, 475 US at 571-72.
20 F3d at 915.
1 Id.
.0 Id. Stewart disrupted the hearing by refusing to enter a plea, swearing at the
judge, and causing the court to recess in order to remove him from the courtroom. Id at
913 n 2.
1 Id.
' 20 F3d at 916. The court stated that the defendant's appearance in prison clothing
is less prejudicial than wearing leg irons, and that "[p]rison clothing is inherently prejudi-
cial only if a defendant's appearance does not otherwise inform the jury of other, more
prejudicial impermissible factors." Id. In this case, the leg irons provided the same preju-
dicial effect regardless of the prison clothing - Stewart's appearance would have been no
less prejudicial if he had appeared in civilian clothing. Id.
Stewart v Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 500 (9th Cir 1988).
The options both courts considered in these cases are discussed in more depth in
Part IV A.
' 961 F2d 985 (1st Cir 1992).
" Oses v Massachusetts, 775 F Supp 443, 447-49 (D Mass 1991).
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constitutional rights.' Oses had worn leg irons at times during
the trial, and at one point he was placed in wrist manacles."°
The court even attempted to gag Oses while the prosecutor cross-
examined his mother." ° The trial was punctuated throughout by
frequent confrontations between Oses and the judge."' The Dis-
trict Court concluded that "[t]hese confrontations served to belit-
tle and demean Oses and his pro se representation before the
jury." " The trial judge also excluded Oses from bench and lobby
conferences, allowing only his standby counsel to take part.'
In order to assess whether the trial court had violated Oses's
Sixth Amendment right of self-representation, the District Court
looked to both the extent of actual control Oses retained over his
defense and the jury's perception of his status as one represent-
ing himself."4 Under McKaskle v Wiggins,"5 a trial court must
accord a pro se defendant the appearance of one conducting his
own defense in a manner that "affirm[s] the accused's individual
dignity and autonomy.""6 Applying this test, the District Court
in Oses found that the misconduct of the trial judge, especially in
excluding Oses from bench and lobby conferences, was constitu-
tionally impermissible error."7 The court further held that the
physical restraints employed to restrict Oses's movement were
inconsistent with constitutional principles of pro se representa-
tion."' The District Court held that the state court had commit-
ted impermissible error by restraining the defendant without suf-
ficient justification, by not inquiring into the least restrictive
1 Id at 445-46.
'" Id at 448.
11 Id at 449. Oses continually interrupted while the prosecutor was cross-examining
Oses's mother through a Spanish interpreter, even after the trial judge warned Oses to
stop interrupting. Id at 472 n 13 (Appendix A). At one point Oses objected to the cross-
examination "on grounds that the prosecutor 'is confusing my mother. My mother is a
nervous woman" Id at 461.
... For example, during voir dire the judge told Oses to "Act like a lawyer if you want
to be a lawyer." 775 F Supp at 461. When Oses was cross-examining a witness about why
he had been at Oses's girlfriend's house, the judge suggested that "[m]aybe she was
cheating on you." Id. The judge also used slang repeatedly to direct Oses to be quiet, at
one point saying to Oses: "Shut up. You seem to have a chronic inability to keep that
mouth shut." Id at 461 n 24.
112 Id at 449.
... Id at 448.
11, 775 F Supp at 456. This test comes from McKaskle v Wiggins, in which the Su-
preme Court articulated the rights a pro se defendant must enjoy in order to assure vindi-
cation of the principles recognized inFaretta. 465 US 168, 178 (1984).
1' 465 US 168 (1984).
... Id at 178.
.. 775 F Supp at 458-59.
.. Id at 459-60.
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means necessary to maintain security and order, by failing to in-
form the jury that shackling had no bearing on the defendant's
guilt or innocence, and by failing to employ the standards for
shackling and gagging a criminal defendant set out in Illinois v
Allen."'
D. Summary of the Weaknesses in Current Law
The facts in the Stewart and Oses cases differ significantly,
as do the grounds for appeal and the specific holdings. 2 ' How-
ever, they are bound by a common strand. Each court considered
the effect that physical restraints had on the pro se defendant's
constitutional rights. Since such decisions currently must be
made on a case-by-case basis, courts have very little guidance
regarding how to balance a defendant's right of self-
representation with the need for fairness and efficiency in the
courtroom. The next Part of this Comment explores what courts
should do when faced with this situation.
IV. PROTECTING A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF SELF-
REPRESENTATION
The above cases illustrate the complex balancing a court
must perform when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation conflicts with the dignity or effective-
ness of the judicial process. The consequence of a mistake is
grave: the defendant is denied due process of law.' Although
few cases have directly addressed the detrimental effects of
physical restraints on the efficacy of a pro se defense, the poten-
tial injury to the defendant is very real.'22 Restraining the defen-
dant may compromise his rights to self representation, an impar-
tial jury, and effective assistance of counsel. The gravity of these
injuries mandates action in order to protect a defendant from im-
properly imposed physical restraints.
Three court-adopted rules could significantly reduce the
Id, citing Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 344 (1970).
' The most significant factual difference is the role the judge played in Oses's origi-
nal trial. Nonetheless, the Oses court clearly stated that the physical restraints also vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment rights.
2' The court in Oses found the due process violation serious enough to require that a
new trial be ordered or the defendant set free fourteen years after the original conviction.
Oses v Massachusetts, 775 F Supp 443, 466-67 (D Mass 1991).
" See Abdullah v Groose, 44 F3d 692, 695 (8th Cir 1995), vacated on procedural
grounds by 75 F3d 408 (8th Cir 1996), (concluding that "[tihe shackling was a specific
circumstance creating difficulties of self-representation ....- ).
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threat to pro se defendants' rights: (1) every trial court should
hold a hearing and enter findings before imposing restraints on a
pro se defendant; (2) the trial court should provide a right to
challenge the necessity of those restraints; and (3) the trial court
should always appoint standby counsel so that someone is pre-
pared to take over should the defendant relinquish his right of
self-representation, either voluntarily or through misconduct.
A. A Pro Se Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights
By choosing to represent himself, a pro se defendant does not
relinquish his right to a fair trial. He simply waives the assis-
tance of court-appointed counsel. Other Sixth Amendment guar-
antees still apply." While judges have discretion to restrain
criminal defendants who obstruct courtroom proceedings,"' doing
so can have drastic effects on the fairness of the trial. First, re-
straining a pro se defendant runs the risk of effectively denying
the defendant his right of self-representation. Moreover, the
presence of restraints can prejudice the jury against the defen-
dant. Finally, the practical limitations restraints create may
amount to denial of effective assistance of counsel. All of these
conditions violate the Sixth Amendment guarantees of a fair
trial.
1. Infringements on the Right of Self-Representation.
The right of self-representation is not absolute. Once a court
has granted a defendant pro se status, however, it should not un-
dermine his ability to represent himself.' The defendant must
retain both actual control over his defense and the perception of
such control in the eyes of the jury.'26 Physical restraints can re-
strict the defendant's body language, movement around the
courtroom, and ability to take notes or speak. These tools gener-
ally comprise an important part of an attorney's presentation and
trial participation. In addition to depriving the defendant of ac-
tual control, the visible presence of physical restraints can also
12' Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 818 (1975) (finding the Sixth Amendment rights
essential to adversary system of criminal justice, and part of the due process of law guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
17 Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 343 (1970) ("The flagrant disregard in the courtroom
of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated."); Estelle v
Williams, 425 US 501, 505 n 2 (1976) ("[A] defendant cannot be allowed to abort a trial
and frustrate the process of justice by his own acts.").
125 See, for example, Oses v Massachusetts, 775 F Supp 443, 463 (D Mass 1991).
McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 178-79 (1984).
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deny the defendant the appearance of control.27 The jury sees a
defendant who cannot move freely or who needs assistance to per-
form simple tasks such as presenting evidence to a witness or
pointing to exhibits. These conditions effectively destroy the de-
fendant's Faretta rights."2 In many situations, the court must
order restraints, but it should acknowledge that doing so in-
fringes upon the right of self-representation, and therefore should
exercise great caution in order to preserve all of the defendant's
rights to the greatest extent possible.
2. Jury Prejudice.
The potential for prejudicing the jury offends the basic prin-
ciples of fairness and justice integral to the American criminal
justice system."2  In Illinois v Allen,"' the Supreme Court
authorized the limited restraint of defendants, but recognized
that seeing the defendant shackled and gagged could affect the
jury's feelings about him. 3' Shackling is highly disfavored be-
cause it may deprive the defendant of the presumption of inno-
cence by signaling to the jury that the court has already deter-
mined the defendant is dangerous or uncontrollable. 32 Thomas
Oses and Alexander Stewart both challenged their convictions
because they believed the restraints imposed on them had preju-
diced the jury." Oses, in fact, persuaded the court that the
amount of jury prejudice he suffered required reversal of his con-
viction."
One might counter that the defendant's disruptive or offen-
7 The Eighth Circuit has pointed out that a physically restrained pro se defendant
often has only the "Hobson's choice" between limiting his own movement by staying seated
or trying to conduct his defense as best he can, thereby drawing the jury's attention to the
limitations created by his restraints. Both courses create the perception of incomplete
advocacy. Abdullah v Groose, 44 F3d 692, 695 (8th Cir 1991).
13 See, for example, id at 694-95; Oses, 775 F Supp at 463 n 27.
' See Comment, New Jersey's Other-Crimes Rules and the Evidence Committee's
Abrogation of Almost Two Hundred Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 394,
446 (1993).
10 397 US 337 (1970).
131 Id at 344 ("[T]he sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the
jury's feelings about the defendant .... ."). Court attempts to hide physical restraints from
the jury may exacerbate the danger of jury prejudice. See Jones v Meyer, 899 F2d 883,
885 (9th Cir 1990) (judge handcuffed one of defendant's arms to his wheelchair but cov-
ered it with a sweater or jacket); Scurr v Moore, 647 F2d 854, 855 (8th Cir 1981) (defen-
dant wore handcuffs and a body belt inside a coat).
"3 Hamilton v Vasquez, 882 F2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir 1989), affd in part, 17 F3d 1149
(9th Cir 1994).
32 Oses v Massachusetts, 775 F Supp 443, 463 (D Mass 1991); Stewart v Corbin, 850
F2d 492, 497 (9th Cir 1988); United States v Stewart, 20 F3d 911, 915 (8th Cir 1994).
"34 Oses, 775 F Supp at 466-67.
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sive behavior justifies any prejudicial effect that restraints might
have. However, defendants do not waive their constitutional
rights simply because they disrupt the court. The very idea that
disruptive behavior equals guilt contradicts both the presumption
of innocence and the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
The use of restraints is not always prejudicial.'35 The combi-
nation of physical restraints and self-representation, however,
warrants judicial caution.136 The potential for jury prejudice
jeopardizes the right to a fair trial. When the defendant repre-
sents himself, he stands to lose the jury's impartial assessment of
his defense and of his innocence.
3. Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Faretta stated that pro se defendants do not have the option
of appealing their convictions on the basis of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel." 7 Allowing otherwise would create the very
strange situation where a defendant could select self-
representation and thereby create "a safety net for reversal"
based on his inadequate performance." However, the Faretta
Court did not explicitly contemplate the problems raised by the
physical restraint of a pro se defendant." 9 Therefore, it may be
possible to carve out an exception, allowing appeals when the
court adds restraints after the defendant waives counsel.140 This
exception seems reasonable because the addition of restraints
impairs a defendant's ability to represent himself in a way that
he could not have anticipated when he waived counsel.
In Strickland v Washington,' the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-pronged test to evaluate claims of ineffective assis-
Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 344 (1970).
Abdullah v Groose, 44 F2d 692, 695 (8th Cir 1991).
7 Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 834 n 46 (1975). See also United States v
McDowell, 814 F2d 245, 251 (6th Cir 1987) ('he only thing that was 'unfair' about
McDowell's trial was that he did not represent himself very well. .. ."); United States v
Dujanovic, 486 F2d 182, 188 (9th Cir 1973) ("[O]ne of the penalties of the appellants self-
representation is that he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record.").
1 Comment, The Right to Proceed Pro Se at Competency Hearings: Practical Solutions
to a Constitutional Catch-22, 47 U Miami L Rev 883, 892 (1993).
1 See generally Faretta, 422 US 806 (1975); Comment, 47 Miami L Rev at 834-35 n
46.
" In Abdullah v Groose, the Eighth Circuit noted that the combination of shackles
and self-representation is particularly prejudicial, and held that a defendant could only
make a knowing and intelligent waiver if informed of this added prejudice. 44 F3d 693,
694-95 (8th Cir 1995), vacated on procedural grounds by 75 F3d 4098 (8th Cir 1996)
(stating that Faretta requires that the defendant seeking to represent himself should be
informed by the trial judge of the particular complexities and difficulties that shackling
causes).
... 466 US 668 (1984).
RESTRAINING PRO SE DEFENDANTS
tance of counsel.142  First, the defendant must prove that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness.'" Second, the defendant must show that his counsel's
deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome of his
trial.'" Some circumstances constitute per se prejudice, bypass-
ing the Strickland analysis.'45 The limitations inherent in physi-
cal restraints directly affect the pro se counsel's performance.
Gagging a pro se defendant, for example, makes him unable to
participate in trial, a condition which can be per se prejudicial. 46
Similarly, an attorney's absence during critical stage of trial has
been found per se prejudicial,47 and is comparable to removing a
defendant from the courtroom. Cases of shackling or handcuffing
a defendant to restrict movement are probably not per se prejudi-
cial, but may meet the Strickland test if evaluated on their indi-
vidual facts.
B. The Need for Court Action
One might suggest that, because so few defendants have
challenged their convictions on the grounds that physical
restraints denied them a constitutionally guaranteed opportunity
to represent themselves, the issue is not important. In fact, just
the opposite may be true. The small number of appeals and
habeas corpus writs on this issue may result from the pro se
defendant's lack of legal sophistication.'" The defendant can only
allege violation of a right if he knows the right exists. The few
cases on point can easily become lost in the flood of pro se
proceedings.'49
2 Id at 687.
" Id at 687-91. Defense attorneys must promote a meaningful adversarial confron-
tation in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See
United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 656-57 (1984) (discussing defense counsel's role as
effective advocate).
466 US at 491-96.
14 See, for example, Green v Am, 809 F2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir 1987), vacated, 484 US
806 (1987), reinstated on remand, 839 F2d 300 (6th Cir 1988) (counsel's absence during
critical stages of trial was per se prejudicial); Martin v Rose, 744 F2d 1245, 1250-51 (6th
Cir 1984) (counsel's lack of participation rendered adversarial process unreliable, consti-
tuting per se prejudice).
'" Martin, 744 F2d 1245, 1250-51.
147 Am, 809 F2d 1257, 1263.
'" There is a separate question concerning why "jailhouse lawyers" with a great deal
of knowledge and experience in criminal procedure do not bring these appeals. For an
explanation of the general characteristics ofjailhouse lawyers and the role they play, see
Note, Ensuring Meaningful Jailhouse Legal Assistance: The Need for A Jailhouse Lawyer-
Inmate Privilege, 1997 Cardozo L Rev 1569, 1570-75.
"' The sparse data on pro se filings in the federal courts indicates that pro se liti-
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With so few prisoners bringing these claims, and the mixed
outcomes discussed above, 5' judges have broad discretion and
very little guidance when confronted with obstreperous defen-
dants who wish to represent themselves. Criminal defendants
waive counsel for many different reasons, some understandable
and others obstructionist. 5' Judges have the responsibility of
promoting justice and protecting constitutional rights. When a
criminal defendant elects to proceed pro se, courts must consider
a complex interplay of constitutional, social, and ethical
concerns.'52 Society demands "that our criminal justice system
must determine the truth or falsity of the charges in a manner
consistent with fundamental fairness." 3 In the case of an ob-
streperous pro se defendant, the mandate to provide a fair trial
can directly conflict with the right of self-representation.TM Nei-
ther should supersede the other, yet in the face of a conflict, one
must give way. No forum has adequately addressed the tension
between the two. The courts must take precautions to protect
gants, and especially prisoner pro se litigants, file in huge numbers. In 1993, for example,
pro se appeals comprised 37 percent of all appeals filed in the United States Courts of
Appeals (excluding the Federal Circuit). Of those, 66 percent were prisoner petitions, 27
percent were civil appeals (excluding prisoner petitions), 6 percent were criminal appeals,
and 2 percent were bankruptcy appeals. Marilyn M. Ducharme, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Pro Se Appeals: Pro Se Case Processing in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 1-2 (Nov 1994). The burden of the vast number of frivolous prisoner suits has
created hostility to the entire category of lawsuits, potentially obscuring the few meritori-
ous prisoner lawsuits. See Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for
Needles in Haystacks, 62 Brooklyn L Rev 519, 520 (1996).
See Part III.
"' One common reason for waiver is the defendant's general distrust of the legal sys-
tem or defense lawyers. See, for example, State v Bauer, 245 NW2d 848, 859 (Minn 1976)
('[T]he defendant's reason for wishing to dispense with defense counsel was his paranoid
distrust of everyone connected with the judicial system."); Commonwealth v Davis, 573
A2d 1101, 1102 (Pa Super 1990) ("[Alppellant stated that with regard to attorneys: 'I don't
trust them."). A defendant may also wish to dispose of counsel if he is dissatisfied with
the defense attorney's attention or strategy. See, for example, People v Crandell, 760 P2d
423, 431 (Cal 1988) (en banc) (defendant was upset by the public defender's advice to
plead guilty before investigating the facts); Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 810 (1975)
(defendant told the trial judge that he did not wish to be represented by the public de-
fender because that office was too overwhelmed with cases). Sometimes the defendant
may move to waive counsel just to frustrate the purposes of the court. Illinois v Allen, 397
US 337, 339-41 (1970) (defendant repeatedly stated that there was not going to be a trial
because he, as the defense attorney, was just going to keep arguing).
1 Comment, 47 U Miami L Rev at 900 (cited in note 138).
People v McIntyre, 324 NE2d 322, 325 (NY App 1974) (holding that an outburst
provoked by court misbehavior does not justify forfeiture of the right of self-representa-
tion).
" The court's goals include accuracy in determining guilt or innocence, efficiency in
processing, and procedural control of the proceedings. The pro se defendant's lack of legal
sophistication can hinder the court's achievement of these goals, but self-representation is
still a guaranteed right upon which courts must not infringe. Comment, 47 U Miami L
Rev at 909-11 (cited in note 138).
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defendants' constitutional rights even though the individuals are
not pursuing enforcement of those rights on their own.
C. Three Procedural Safeguards
Currently, when the question of appropriate restraints for
the defendant arises, trial judges have sufficient discretion to ac-
commodate the circumstances of each case.155  For guidance,
judges often look to cases where defendants have behaved simi-
larly, 5" but past decisions are seldom persuasive because the
judges must base their determinations on the specific circum-
stances at hand. Due to factual differences between cases and
the unique position of the trial judge as the best person to assess
them, discretion remains the best way to deal fairly with belliger-
ent defendants. Still, a few standard practices for dealing with
pro se defendants might help further uniformity, efficiency, and
fairness.
1. A Mandatory Hearing.
Holding an in camera hearing to evaluate restraining meas-
ures will help preserve the dignity of the courtroom and avoid
any unnecessary prejudicial effect on the jury.57 Following the
hearing, the judge should make a record of his findings, explain-
ing his reasons for rejecting or imposing restraints. Unfortu-
nately, some courts have decided against requiring a formal
hearing and findings before issuing an order to shackle the de-
fendant, 5 ' although a few jurisdictions do require such
measures.
59
The hearing can serve several purposes. First, the judge can
use the hearing to warn the defendant about the consequences of
Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 343-44 (1970).
For example, past escape from custody often provides sufficient basis for shackling
a defendant during a subsequent trial. Stewart v Corbin, 850 F2d 492, 494-95 (9th Cir
1988) (testimony at pretrial shackling hearing indicated that the defendant was an escape
risk); Wilson v McCarthy, 770 F2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir 1985) (shackling proper where
there is a serious threat of escape).
. ,' Holding the hearing before trial begins is always preferable because it prevents the
jury from noticing implementation of or increase in restraints during the trial. Stewart,
850 F2d at 498. Sometimes, however, a defendant will not exhibit problematic behavior
until after the trial begins. Accordingly, whenever possible, the court should halt pro-
ceedings and remove the jury so that the court can hear the question of appropriate re-
straints without any unnecessary jury prejudice.
"' Jones v Meyer, 899 F2d 883, 886 (9th Cir 1990) ("[W]e have never held, and we
refuse to hold now, that a trial court must conduct a hearing and make findings before
ordering that a defendant be shackled.").
" See, for example, United States v Theriault, 531 F2d 281, 285 (5th Cir 1976);
Zygadlo v Wainwright, 720 F2d 1221, 1222 n 3 (11th Cir 1983).
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disruptive behavior. The defendant then has the opportunity to
consider his actions and agree to the judge's requirements for fu-
ture conduct. Of course, such a conversation will not always con-
vince a defendant to reform his behavior, but it may benefit de-
fendants who are willing to comply. After such a hearing, the
court may impose restraints, confident that the defendant re-
ceived adequate warning of potential detrimental consequences.
A court could also use the hearing to present the defendant
with a contractual arrangement. The defendant could agree to
maintain certain standards of decorum, and in return, the court
would agree to refrain from imposing restraints. If the defendant
violates the agreed-upon rules of conduct, he automatically for-
feits his pro se status and becomes subject to restraints."e
This system has the benefit of formalism, preserving the de-
fendant's autonomy.'' The defendant has the opportunity to par-
ticipate in and respond to a rules-oriented system, furthering rule
of law virtues like predictability, notice, and open decision mak-
ing."' Development of a standardized agreement, however, will
be difficult, given the wide discretion judges currently employ.
The terms will have to define unacceptable behavior and set ap-
propriate default restraints. A court could either adopt a form
contract by local rules, or could make individual contracts re-
sponsive to individual circumstances.
This Comment proposes a strict rule that a court hold a
hearing, but does not propose standardized reasons for restrain-
ing a defendant. Judges should maintain discretion to respond to
various circumstances. Requiring the judge to record his find-
ings, however, will further uniformity and guide future decisions.
These findings may also help resolve challenges to restraints
which might arise on appeal. Thus, the record requirement can
guide judges who must determine the appropriate level of re-
straint as well as defendants who are able to conform their be-
havior to acceptable standards.
2. An Opportunity to Challenge the Need for Restraints.
At the hearing to determine appropriate restraints, the judge
should allow the defendant an opportunity to challenge the need
60 The court would need to have standby counsel available to take over the case if the
defendant misbehaves.
.6 In Faretta, the Court recognized that there are relevant interests for both society
and the individual, but held that when these interests collide, the principle of defendant
autonomy prevails. Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 832-34 (1975).
1" Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 968-77 (1995).
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for restraints." In this way, the defendant can object to the im-
position of restraints without prejudicing the jury. The defendant
may believe his conduct was justified or may have realized his
mistakes and wish to correct them. At the hearing, he can pres-
ent his position, which should then be included in the required
record along with the judge's findings and reasoning. The defen-
dant thus has the opportunity to argue that he is significantly
different from defendants requiring restraints, preserving some
discretion within the rule of a mandatory hearing and automatic
default agreements."G
3. Mandatory Standby Counsel for all Pro Se Defendants.
The trial court should appoint standby counsel as a matter of
course when a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right of
self-representation in order to protect the defendant's interest
and the interests of the court. By doing so, the court can reduce
the harm to a pro se defendant's constitutional rights, should it
become necessary to shackle or gag him.
In Faretta, the Supreme Court approved appointment of
standby counsel as an option for courts." Courts have generally
treated this option as discretionary, not as a right to which de-
fendants are entitled." However, courts can appoint standby
counsel, even over the defendant's objection. 6 ' Courts have held
that neither presence nor unsolicited participation of standby
counsel necessarily interferes with a defendant's Faretta rights."
The proper inquiry should focus on "whether the defendant had a
fair chance to present his case in his own way."6 9 The standby
counsel is restrained by two factors: (1) the pro se defendant is
entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to pre-
sent to the jury; and (2) participation by standby counsel without
the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the
" This is not an original idea, but courts have not practiced it on a wide scale. See,
for example, Elledge v Dugger, 823 F2d 1439, 1450-52 (11th Cir 1973) (holding that de-
fendant was denied due process when he was shackled without having an opportunity to
contest the necessity of shackling).
"' This system resembles a rule of law ideal described by Cass Sunstein - privately
adaptable rules. Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 1016-20 (cited in note 162).
1 Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 834 n 46 (1975).
" McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 183 (1984) (Faretta does not require trial judge
to permit 'hybrid' representation"); Locks v Sumner, 703 F2d 403, 407-08 (9th Cir 1983)
(explaining that no court has found an absolute right to advisory counsel).
McKaskle, 465 US at 184.
In McKaskle, for example, the Court allowed substantial involvement of standby
counsel, even over the defendant's objection, so long as the defendant's general control
remained intact. Id at 183.
1" Id at 177.
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jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.'
Appointing standby counsel in all pro se criminal cases will
not frustrate these requirements. In fact, if standby counsel
must take over, he may actually further these purposes. Because
the standby counsel will have been present throughout the trial,
he may have a relationship with the defendant and some under-
standing of how the defendant wants his defense conducted.
True, some problems with forcing standby counsel on an un-
willing defendant remain. Defendants who are hostile to the ju-
dicial process in general may resent the intrusion even if the
standby counsel does not interfere. 7' Judges may also be more
inclined to behave like the trial judge in Oses, ignoring the defen-
dant in favor of his standby counsel.'72 However, a clear rule that
the court must include the defendant as long as he represents
himself should resolve this problem. 3
Critics may also object to additional administrative costs of
compensating mandatory standby counsel. The total costs, how-
ever, should not exceed those the court needs to meet the re-
quirement that all indigent defendants have access to an attor-
ney, as required by Gideon v Wainwright.l" Because defendants
in state and federal courts already have the right to court-
appointed counsel before being imprisoned, appointing standby
counsel will not impose any additional financial burdens. The
burden is already in place, alleviated only by the pro se defendant
who does not receive standby counsel.
The benefits of appointing standby counsel outweigh the
costs of doing so.7 5 As long as the standby counsel limits his par-
ticipation within the confines of McKaskle 6 and Faretta,77 his
presence helps both the pro se defendant and the court.7" Not
only can standby counsel provide the defendant with advice on
... Id at 178-79. Of course, these considerations disappear if a defendant loses his
right to self-representation through misconduct or voluntary relinquishment.
"' Comment, 72 Cal L Rev at 718 (cited in note 35).
" See, for example, Oses v Massachusetts, 775 F Supp 443, 458-59 (D Mass 1991);
United States v McDermott, 64 F3d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir 1995).
'" Indeed, courts still could include a defendant in bench conferences after he has lost
his pro se status, given the Faretta Court's emphasis on defendant control of his defense,
422 US at 834, and the defendant's obvious wish to control his defense. Doing so may be
unreasonably burdensome, however, if the defendants involved are shackled to immovable
objects.
11 372 US 335 (1963).
's For an analysis of the benefits of mandatory standby counsel, see Comment, 72 Cal
L Rev at 697 (cited in note 35).
' 465 US 168.
' 422 US 806.
1 For a discussion of the proper role of mandatory standby counsel, see id at 807-16.
RESTRAINING PRO SE DEFENDANTS
courtroom procedure, he can also take over if the defendant loses
his right to continue representing himself. In this way, courts
further judicial efficiency, protect the dignity of the courtroom
from disruptive defendants, and avoid violating the defendant's
constitutional rights. The appointment of standby counsel can
safeguard both the court and the defendant.79
CONCLUSION
The propriety of imposing physical restraints on a pro se de-
fendant reaches the core tension of our criminal justice system.
The challenge is to optimally balance the rights of the defendant
as guaranteed by the Constitution with the obvious need to main-
tain an orderly judicial process. Defendants who are shackled or
gagged at trial generally have behaved in ways that warrant this
treatment - frequently either violent behavior, verbal disrup-
tion, or a prior escape attempt. If courts allowed such conduct,
they would compromise their ability to administer justice. Nev-
ertheless, shackling or gagging a defendant is a drastic measure
with serious consequences. Therefore, courts should undertake it
cautiously, providing ample protection to the defendant. Protec-
tions should include a hearing on the record to determine the
need for restraints, with an opportunity for the defendant to
challenge the charge. The court should also appoint standby
counsel, potentially benefiting both the defendant and the court.
In this way, judges will retain the ability to enforce order in the
courtroom, and defendants will have a fair chance to avail them-
selves of their right of self-representation.
" See, for example, United States v Gonzales-Quezada, 108 F3d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir
1997), cert denied, 117 S Ct 2467 and 118 S Ct 121 (1997) (finding no violation of defen-
dant's right to self-representation when standby counsel took over after the court termi-
nated the defendant's pro se status due to disruptive behavior).
349] 373

